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Abstract 
In this article, we study a two level supply chain model for deteriorating items, in which the supplier’s 
production system is unreliable and the retailer’s demand is price sensitive. The supplier’s production line 
may randomly shift from the in-control state to the out-of-control state. When the production line is in the 
out-of-control state, a proportion of the produced products will have bad quality. To mitigate the 
out-of-control risks, the supplier can improve the production line reliability by investing in high quality 
machines, highly skilled workers, or advanced maintenance technologies. We start with the study of pricing 
and inventory problems concerning endogenous reliability in the integrated and decentralized scenario. To 
better illustrate the proposed models, two applicable algorithms are designed to determine the optimal 
production reliability, ordering quantity and prices. Then, a cooperative reliability investment and revenue 
sharing contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis of 
the equilibrium strategies and coordinating results on key system parameters (e.g. deterioration rate, 
production rate, etc.) are given to verify the effectiveness of the contract, and meanwhile get some 
managerial insights.  
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1. Introduction 
Deterioration is defined as decay, change or spoilage through which the quality and/or the quantity of the 
items are decreasing (Ghare & Schrader, 1963). Such items include fresh fruits, fresh vegetables, blood, and 
fashion products, etc. Product deterioration takes place frequently in inventory systems and often causes 
great losses to inventory managers, especially in multi-level supply chains due to long distance transport or 
unmatched demand and supply. For example, about 15% of perishable foods are wasted in the food retailing 
sector (Ferguson & Ketzenberg, 2004). In China, more than 25% of fruits and vegetables are deteriorated 
during transportation, at wholesale markets and in shops1. In addition, in real industry, it is almost impossible 
for firms to have a perfect reliable production line in a long run production process. For example, the wear of 
machine parts reduces the reliability of production process, which affects the quality of the produced 
products (Atan & Snyder, 2014; Sana et al., 2007).  
Providing good quality products to customers will enhance customers’ satisfactions, thus improve firms’ 
competitiveness and economical benefits. Procurement managers are becoming more concerned about the 
quality of the products provided by the supplier to maintain high customer satisfaction in today’s markets 
with fierce competition and fast changing customer preferences. Therefore, producers are incentivized to 
improve product quality and production reliability by investing in the installation of high quality machines, 
the employment of high-skill workers, or the adoption of advanced maintenance technologies (Huang et al., 
2017). The improved production reliability ensures high quality of the products selling through downstream 
buyers to customers. Therefore, the reliability investment not only benefits the producer itself, but also 
benefits the buyers.  
In practice, to mitigate the negative impacts of producer’s production risks, downstream buyers often 
adopting various risk preventing strategies including multi-sourcing, backup sourcing, and emergency 
purchases (see Dada et al., 2011; Gurnani et al., 2000; Tomlin, 2006). Nowadays, another increasingly 
popular approach is buyers providing subsidies on producers’ production reliability investments to lower 
costs, increase products’ quality, and improve reliability (see Liu et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010). For 
example, it is a common practice in the automotive industry that companies like Honda, Toyota, BMW, and 
Hyundai are working with their suppliers to improve performance (Krause et al., 2007).  
1 Roebuck M. (2015) “China must improve its cool supply chain to keep pace with demand for fresh food” The 
cool star. http://theloadstar.co.uk/coolstar/china-must-improve-its-cool-supply-chain-to-keep-pace-with-demand 
-for-fresh-food/ (Accessed on 2018/2/24)  
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As studied by Tang et al. (2014), with a well-designed subsidy strategy, the individual performance for 
both the buyer and producer can be improved. However, how product deterioration will affect the optimal 
process reliability, the associated pricing and inventory decisions are still unclear in literature. In this article, 
we study a two level supply chain consists of an unreliable supplier and a downstream retailer. The supplier 
produces and distributes deteriorating products to end customers through the downstream retailer. The 
supplier can also invest to improve the process reliability of its production system. First, we model the 
integrated and the decentralized supply chain for deteriorating items without cooperative investment, and 
study the determination of optimal process reliability, prices and inventories for both firms and total supply 
chain. Second, we designed a revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract to coordinate the supply 
chain. Through numerical simulations, we compared the optimal decision strategies in the integrated and the 
decentralized scenarios, and tested the efficiency of the coordinating contract. Some important managerial 
implications are presented as well.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a comprehensive literature review is 
presented. In section 3, main assumptions and notations used in the paper are listed. In section 4, the model is 
formulated, which is followed by strategy analysis and coordination methods in section 5. Numerical 
analysis is presented in Section 6, along with some important managerial insights. Then, the paper is 
concluded in the last section. 
2. Literature review 
Our research is closely related to three streams: (a) supply chain management for deteriorating products, (b) 
inventory models considering production unreliability, and (c) gaming in deteriorating product supply chains, 
and (c) gaming in deteriorating product supply chains.  
The first stream of literature refers to the inventory management problems for deteriorating products. 
According to Ghare and Schrader (1963) and Shah, Soni, and Patel (2013), deterioration is defined as decay, 
change, or spoilage so that the items are not in its initial conditions. There are two categories of deteriorating 
items. The first category refers to the items that become decayed, damaged, or expired with time, e.g. meat, 
vegetables, fruits, medicine, and so on. The second category is the items that lose part or total value with 
time, e.g. computer chips, mobile phones, fashion and seasonal products, and so on. Both kinds of items have 
short life cycles and after a period of existence in market, the items lose the original economical value due to 
the drop of consumer preference, product quality, and so on. Ghare and Schrader (1963) first proposed an 
exponentially decaying inventory model. Based on their work, people had done a lot on the economical 
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ordering quantity (EOQ) problems for deterioration products. In this research area, different settings of 
critical factors, e.g. demand rate, deterioration rate, pricing strategies, and so on, have significant impacts on 
the formulation of the models, and the associated solutions and results. Firstly, for demand rate, it can either 
be a constant parameter (Mahata 2012) or be a time-dependent parameter (Dye, Chang, and Teng 2006; Giri, 
Jalan, and Chaudhuri 2003; Wang, Lin, and Jonas 2011). Also, demand can be backlogged (Dye, Chang, and 
Teng 2006), inventory level linked (Burwell et al. 1997), or price-sensitive (Dye and Hsieh 2012; Liang and 
Zhou 2011; Shah, Soni, and Patel 2013). Secondly, for deterioration rate, it can be a constant parameter 
(Liang and Zhou 2011; Sana, Goyal, and Chaudhuri 2004; Thangam and Uthayakumar 2009), a time-linked 
parameter (Skouri et al. 2009), preservation investment-linked parameter (Dye and Hsieh 2013; Hsu, Wee, 
and Teng 2010), or a stochastic parameter (Sarkar 2013, 2012; Sarkar and Sarkar 2013).  
The above research only considers the single-stage inventory problems. Some people studied the 
problems in multi-level supply chains. Lee and Moon (2006) proposed a basic three-level 
producer-vendor-buyer model. Wang, Lin, and Jonas (2011) extended Lee and Moon (2006) by assuming 
that products suffer from time-linked deterioration rate. Besides, many researchers did a lot of work on 
integrated inventory and/or pricing decisions (Chen and Chen 2007; Lo, Wee, and Huang 2007; Noh, Kim, 
and Sarkar 2016; Sarkar et al. 2016), and cooperation strategies (Lin, Yu, and Wang 2009, 2010) in 
multi-level supply chains.  
The second stream of literature is about inventory problems considering production unreliability. In the 
previous research, some papers consider product quality drop during production when the system is in the 
unreliable state (or out-of-control state). Rosenblatt and Lee (1986), Kim, Hong, and Chang (2001), Chung 
and Hou (2003), and Rahim and Al- Hajailan (2006) considered production process breakdown in an 
inventory model, in which, defective items are produced when the production process is disrupted. Then, 
Sana, Goyal, and Chaudhuri (2007), Sana (2010a), and Sana (2010b) developed an EPQ model or EMQ 
model to analyze the optimal production problem with unreliable production process. Following Sana 
(2010b), some more general models were developed. For example, Sarkar (2012) considered the production 
line is unreliable and demand is price linked. Sarkar and Saren (2016) took the inspection errors and 
warranty cost into consideration.  
In addition to quality dropping problems, some papers also studied the production rate dropping 
problems when the system became out-of-control. For example, Glock (2013) considered the full breakdown 
problem. Abboud (1997), Abboud, Jaber, and Noueihed (2000), and Chakraborty, Giri, and Chaudhuri (2008) 
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assumed that the machine unavailability 2 H. Huang et al. time or the repairing time length is random. Chung, 
Widyadana, and Wee (2011) extended the model of Chakraborty, Giri, and Chaudhuri (2008) by considering 
deteriorating items with shortage. Gharbi, Kenn, and Beit (2007) studied the preventive maintenance 
strategies in their inventory models with random machine breakdown. Wee and Widyadana (2012) extended 
the model of Gharbi, Kenn, and Beit (2007) by considering product deterioration. Giri, Yun, and Dohi (2005) 
and Jeang (2012) established an EPQ model when the production process was unreliable. In addition to the 
research on the ‘full breakdown’ models, some people study the ‘partial breakdown’ models, such as, Gavish 
and Graves (1981), Iravani and Duenyas (2002), Ben-Daya, Hariga, and Khursheed (2008), and Huang, He, 
and Li (2017), etc.  
The third stream of literature is about the gaming problems with product deterioration. Zhang et al. 
(2015) studied a two-level price gaming problem between a supplier and a retailer when products are 
perishable. They proposed a revenue and preservation investment-sharing contract to coordinate the supply 
chain. Chen (2017) studied a non-cooperative decision problem between a manufacturer and a retailer with 
imperfect and deteriorating products. The impacts of the price scheme, the replenishment programme, 
imperfect quality, and the rework process are also analysed. Tiwari, Jaggi, and Gupta (2018) studied a 
manufacturer–retailer gaming problem for deteriorating products when the retailer has limited storage 
capacity. Huang, He, and Li (2018) modelled a three-level supply chain which consists of a retailer, a vendor, 
and a supplier, and studied a Stackelberg gaming problem considering supply uncertainty and preservation 
investment. He, Huang, and Li (2018) modelled a dual-channel supply chain with a manufacturer who sells 
through both its direct channel and a down- stream retailer. The impacts of product deterioration on both 
firms’ pricing decisions are discussed.  
In the aforementioned literature, no literature considers reliability investment, pricing, and supply chain 
coordination simultaneously in a two-level supply chain for deteriorating items. Our work extends the study 
of Huang, He, and Li (2017) to a two-echelon supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer. 
Specifically, as the Stackelberg leader, the retailer sets retail price to maximise his own profit, while the 
following supplier pursues its maximum profit by determining the wholesale price as well as the reliability 
investment. Furthermore, we design a revenue-sharing and cooperative investment contract to coordinate the 
supply chain. The main contributions of this paper are threefold. First, this paper addresses the problem of 
reliability investment and pricing in a supply chain system, and fills the gap of supply chain coordination for 
deteriorating items. Second, effective algorithms are proposed to solve such a complex problem, providing 
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an approach to deal with similar kind of issues. Third, numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are 
conducted, which contribute to the finding of some significant managerial implications for supply chain 
management of deteriorating items. 
3. Assumptions and notations 
We consider a two level supply chain consists of a supplier and a retailer, in which the supplier’s production 
system is unreliable (see Figure 1). The production line may shift from the in-control state to the 
out-of-control state during the production run. In the in-control state, all the produced items are in good 
quality; however, in the out-of-control state, bad quality products will be produced, which further affects the 
product quality in the retail side. We study a case in which the supplier’s production reliability is controllable 
by investment. In other words, the supplier can optimally set the system reliability with investment (Huang, 
He, and Li, 2017). The final goal is to determine not only the optimal reliability, but also the prices for both 
parties that maximize the profit of each party in an infinite time horizon. 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of a two level supply chain with unreliable production 
3.1. The endogenous production reliability 
Following Ben-Daya, Hariga, and Khursheed (2008), in the in-control state, the supplier’s production line is 
reliable. All the produced products in the in-control period are in good quality. However, in the out-of-control 
state, part of the produced products will be in bad quality. The in-control time length is a random variable, 
with probability density function 𝑓𝑓(𝑠𝑠)  and cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝐹(𝑠𝑠) . Assuming the 
expectation for s is 𝐸𝐸[𝑠𝑠] = 𝜆𝜆. Following the study of Huang, He, and Li (2017), when the expected in 
control time length 𝐸𝐸[𝑠𝑠] = 𝜆𝜆 is longer, the system is more reliable. On the contrary, when 𝜆𝜆 is smaller, 
out-of-control time of the production system becomes shorter and the system will be less reliable. In the 
following analysis, we use 𝜆𝜆 to denote the production reliability. 
In real industry, companies can enhance the reliability 𝜆𝜆 of their production system by investing in the 
installation of high quality machines, the employment of high-skill workers, or the adoption of advanced 
maintenance technologies (Huang, He, and Li, 2017). In this paper, we assume that the distribution 
parameter 𝜆𝜆 is controllable by investing. The initial production system reliability is assumed to be 𝜆𝜆0. The 
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distribution parameter can be increased to 𝜆𝜆 with a unit time investment 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝜆𝜆). The pattern of the 
investment cost function is assumed to be increasing and convex in 𝜆𝜆, i.e. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅′(𝜆𝜆) > 0 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅′′(𝜆𝜆) > 0, 
which follows the law of diminishing marginal utility (DMU) and with condition 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝜆𝜆 = 𝜆𝜆0) = 0.  
    According to previous research, the in-control time length s may follow a uniform distribution, i.e. 
𝑠𝑠 ∼ 𝑈𝑈[0, 2𝜆𝜆]  (Chakraborty, Giri, and Chaudhuri, 2008; Chung, Widyadana, and Wee, 2011) or an 
exponential distribution, i.e. 𝑠𝑠 ∼ 𝐸𝐸(𝜆𝜆) (Jeang, 2012; Huang, He, and Li, 2017). In the model analysis, we 
first assume that s follows the uniform distribution, which helps us to get some analytical results. We present 
the numerical results for the model with an exponentially distributed s in Appendix A.1. 
3.2. Notations 
We present the notations in Table 1. 
Table 1. Notations 
Decision variables 
𝑤𝑤 supplier’s wholesale price 
𝑝𝑝 retail price 
𝑚𝑚 retailer’s sales margin, 𝑚𝑚 =  𝑝𝑝 −  𝑤𝑤 
𝑄𝑄 retailers ordering quantity 
𝜆𝜆 expectation of in-control time length after reliability investment 
𝛾𝛾 retailer’s shared proportion of reliability investment 
𝜙𝜙 supplier’s revenue sharing rate to the retailer 
Other parameters 
𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟,𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 retailer’s and supplier’s fixed setup cost respectively 
𝑃𝑃 supplier’s production rate, a constant 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 supplier’s per unit item production cost 
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝) customers’ demand rate , a function of retail price 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝, in which 𝑏𝑏 is the 
potential market size, and 𝑎𝑎 is the price sensitive parameter of retailer price. 
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 retailer’s (supplier’s) ordering cycle (production cycle) 
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 supplier’s production starting time in a cycle 
𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 supplier’s production time length, 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠  =  𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 −  𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 
𝜃𝜃 deterioration rate of the products 
𝑘𝑘 cost coefficient of reliability investment cost 
𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡), 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) retailer’s and supplier’s inventory level at time t respectively 
ℎ retailer’s and supplier’s per item per unit time inventory holding cost 
𝑠𝑠 elapsed time period during which the suppliers production line is in in-control state 
𝑓𝑓𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠),𝐹𝐹𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠) probability density function and distribution function of random parameter 𝑠𝑠. The subscript (. )𝜆𝜆 denotes a distribution with mean value 𝜆𝜆 
𝜆𝜆0 initial expectation of the in-control time length before investment 
𝛼𝛼 percentage of bad quality products produced when the production system is in the 
out-of-control state 
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𝑟𝑟 retailer’s penalty cost for selling bad quality products to customers in a cycle 
𝑀𝑀 supplier’s restoration cost in transferring the production line from out-of-control state to 
in-control state 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 supplier’s reliability investment cost per unit time 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 unit time total profit for supply chain member 𝑖𝑖 under channel structure 𝑗𝑗 
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑟𝑟 subscript, which denotes the whole supply chain, the supplier and the retailer respectively 
𝑗𝑗 = 𝑅𝑅,𝐷𝐷,𝑅𝑅 superscript, which denotes the associated decisions of integrated, decentralized, coordinated 
supply chain respectively 
3.3. Assumptions 
We summarize the assumptions as follows:  
(1) In each production cycle, the supplier’s production system starts from an in-control state. After some time, 
the production line may shift to the out-of-control state. During the out-of-control period, a proportion 
𝛼𝛼 (0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1) of the produced products will have bad quality.  
(2) At the end of a production cycle, when the out-of-control state appears, the supplier has to restore its 
production system with a fixed restoration cost 𝑀𝑀. 
(3) The time takes to restore the production system is relatively shorter than the total production cycle length, 
which makes sure the supplier’s production system is in-control at the start of a new production cycle. 
(4) The initial reliability 𝜆𝜆0 can be increased to 𝜆𝜆 with a quadratic unit time investment cost = 𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆 −
𝜆𝜆0)2/2, where 𝑘𝑘 captures the cost coefficient. (Huang, He, and Li, 2017) 
(5) In the supply chain, the retailer is the stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. In real business, 
leading retailers refer to some large groceries including Costco, Walmart, and Tesco. These kinds of 
retailers have strong powers, and they act as leaders in the supply chains. 
(6) The supplier adopts a lot-to-lot inventory policy (see Lee and Moon, 2006) to deliver the products to the 
retailer. Thus the supplier’s production cycle length is equal to the retailer’s ordering cycle. 
(7) Production rate of the supplier is higher than the demand rate, which is to avoid shortages of the supplier. 
4. Model formulation 
The inventory patterns for both firms are presented in Figure 2. According to the assumptions and notations 
mentioned in section 2, we model the supplier, the retailer and the total supply chain profit respectively. 
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 Figure 2. Inventory systems for the retailer and the supplier 
4.1. The retailer’s profit 
Suppose the ordering cycle is 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟. At time, 𝑡𝑡 = 0 the retailer places an order of 𝑄𝑄 units of products to the 
supplier, and the supplier will distribute the ordered products to the retailer at time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟. During the time 
interval [0,𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟], the retailer’s inventory level depletes due to demand and deterioration, which drops to 0 at 
time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟. According to the economical ordering quantity (EOQ) theories for deteriorating products, the 
inventory level satisfies the differential equation  
 𝜕𝜕𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
= −𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝) − 𝜃𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡), 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟],                        (1) 
with boundary condition 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟) = 0.  
Solve the differential equation, and we obtain the retailer’s inventory level  
                              𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡)−1�𝜃𝜃 , 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟].                    (2) 
The ordering quantity can be presented as  
                                 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡 = 0) = 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�𝜃𝜃 .                        (3) 
During one cycle, the retailer’s profit consists of sales revenue, replenishment cost, inventory holding 
cost, fixed starting cost and the penalty cost due to sale of bas quality products.  
1) The sales revenue  
The retailer’s total revenue comes from the sales of the deteriorating products. The total sales revenue in a 
cycle can be calculated as 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟. 
2) The replenishment cost 
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The retailer has to pay an amount of money 𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄 to purchase the products from the supplier.  
3) The inventory holding cost 
The total accumulated inventory for the retailer in one cycle is ∫ 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟0 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡. Therefore, the total inventory 
cost is ∫ ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟0 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡. 
4) The fixed starting cost  
The starting a new selling cycle, the retailer has to pay a lump sum cost of 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟. 
5) The penalty cost  
Customers who purchase and use the low quality products will be unsatisfied, and they may return the 
products or claim the refunds, which will hurt the retailer’s reputation and economical benefit. Therefore, we 
normalize the retailer’s losses caused by selling of bad quality products to a penalty cost 𝑟𝑟.  
It is shown in Figure 1 that, 
• (Scenario 1) when 𝑠𝑠 ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, the supplier’s production system is always in-control and the production 
line is perfectly reliable during the production run. In this situation, the produced products all have good 
quality and the penalty cost equals zero.  
• (Scenario 2) when 𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, the production system will be shifted from the in-control state to the 
out-of-control state at time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠. In other words, in the time interval 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝑠𝑠,𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟], a proportion of the 
producedproducts may have quality risk. In this scenario, the penalty cost is incurred.  
Combining the two scenarios, the probability that the bad quality products will be produced and sold to 
customers can be calculated as  
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑏𝑏𝑄𝑄𝑑𝑑 𝑞𝑞𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑄𝑄 = ∫ 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠0 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠−𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼∫ 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠0 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 . 
Then, we further formulate the penalty cost in a cycle for the retailer as 𝛼𝛼 ∫
𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠0
𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
.  
Combining the above mentioned revenue and costs, the retailer’s unit time total profit can be written as 
    𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑚𝑚) = 1𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 �𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 − 𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄 − ∫ ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟0 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼 ∫ 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠0 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 � = (𝑚𝑚 + 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷(𝑚𝑚 + 𝑤𝑤) − 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷(𝑚𝑚+𝑤𝑤)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
ℎ𝐷𝐷(𝑚𝑚+𝑤𝑤)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
− 𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼
∫ 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠0
𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
           (4)                                                     
4.2. The supplier’s profit 
Based on the assumptions, the supplier adopts a lot-to-lot policy (Lee and Moon, 2006). During each cycle, 
the supplier starts to produce at time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠, and the inventory level of the supplier rises due to the 
simultaneous influence of production and product deterioration, which follows the differential equation  
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                             𝜕𝜕𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
= 𝑃𝑃 − 𝜃𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡), 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟],                           (5) 
with boundary conditions 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 − 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠) = 0 and 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟) = 𝑄𝑄.  
Thus, the inventory level with respect to time can be derived as  
 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃𝜃𝜃 �1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟+𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠)�, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟],                    (6) 
in which 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 = 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 − 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 = − 1𝜃𝜃 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 − 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�𝑃𝑃 �.  
After the retailer sets its sales margin 𝑚𝑚, the supplier sets its wholesale price 𝑤𝑤 and reliability 
parameter 𝜆𝜆 simultaneously to maximize its per unit time total profit. The supplier’s profit consists of 
wholesale revenue, production cost, inventory holding cost, fixed starting cost, reliability investment cost, 
machine restoration cost.  
1) The wholesale revenue  
The supplier’s total revenue comes from the wholesaling of the deteriorating products to the retailer. 
The total sales revenue can be calculated as 𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄. 
2) The production cost  
The supplier’s production time lasts for 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, and the total cost can be calculated as 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠. 
3) The inventory holding cost  
During the production, the accumulated inventory holding quantity in a single cycle is ∫ 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡. 
Thus the total inventory holding cost in a cycle is ∫ ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡. 
4) The fixed starting cost. 
When starting the production, the supplier needs to pay a lump sum fee 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠  per cycle.  
5) The reliability investment cost  
To enhance the production reliability and reach a reliability level of 𝜆𝜆, the supplier has to pay a 
quadratic unit time investment cost of 𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆−𝜆𝜆0)2
2
. Therefore, the total cost in a production cycle is 𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆−𝜆𝜆0)2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
2
. 
6) The expected restoration cost  
When the out-of-control situation happens, the supplier has to restore its production system to the 
in-control state with a fixed cost 𝑀𝑀.  
• (Scenario 1) when 𝑠𝑠 ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, the supplier’s production system is always in-control and there will is no 
restoration cost.  
• (Scenario 2) when 𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, the production system will be shifted from the in-control state to the 
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out-of-control state at time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠. The restoration cost is incurred.  
Therefore, the expectation of the total restoration cost can be calculated as 𝑀𝑀∫ 𝑓𝑓𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠0 = 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝜆𝜆(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠). 
Combining the above revenue and costs, the unit time total profit for the supplier can be presented as  
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤, 𝜆𝜆) = 1𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 �𝑤𝑤𝑄𝑄 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 − ∫ ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 −𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝜆𝜆(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠)� − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝜆𝜆) = 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷(𝑤𝑤+𝑚𝑚)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
ℎ𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠−1�
𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠)
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆−𝜆𝜆0)2
2
    (7) 
in which 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 = − 1𝜃𝜃 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 − 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�𝑃𝑃 �.  
4.3. Supply chain’s profit 
The unit total profit for the whole supply chain is the sum of both firms’ profit, which can be expressed as  
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝, 𝜆𝜆) = 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑚𝑚) + 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤, 𝜆𝜆) 
         = 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝) − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
ℎ𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
ℎ𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠−1�
𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
 
           −𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
− 𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼
∫ 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠0
𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠)
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
− 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝜆𝜆) 
         = �𝑝𝑝 + ℎ
𝜃𝜃
�𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝) − �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃+ℎ𝑃𝑃�𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
− 𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼
∫ 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠0
𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠)
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆−𝜆𝜆0)2
2
                    (8) 
5. Strategies analysis and supply chain coordination 
In this section, we derive the optimal pricing and reliability investment under integrated and decentralized 
supply chain structures. In the integrated scenario, the two members jointly determine the retailer price and 
reliability investment. In the integrated supply chain, the retailer first decides the optimal sales margin, then 
the supplier determines the wholesale price and reliability investment, which aims to maximize the 
individual profit for each firm.  
5.1. Integrated scenario 
To simplify our analysis and to get some analytical results, we study the model when 𝑠𝑠 uniformly 
distributed. The initial distribution is 𝑈𝑈[0,2𝜆𝜆0]. After investment, the distribution turns to 𝑈𝑈[0,2𝜆𝜆](𝜆𝜆 ≥ 𝜆𝜆0).   
We start with a benchmark case, in which the supplier and the retailer are vertically integrated. The profit 
function of the total supply chain can be simplified as  
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝, 𝜆𝜆) = �𝑝𝑝 + ℎ𝜃𝜃�𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝) − �𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 + ℎ𝑃𝑃 + 𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼4𝜆𝜆 + 𝑀𝑀2𝜆𝜆� 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 – 𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆−𝜆𝜆0)22 − 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 – 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟          (9) 
The target of the supply chain is to find the optimal selling price and an optimal reliability parameter λ. 
The corresponding optimization problem is formulated as  
                                  𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝,𝜆𝜆: {𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝, 𝜆𝜆)}                             (10) 
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𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.    𝑝𝑝 ≤ 𝑏𝑏
𝑄𝑄
, 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 𝜆𝜆0.  
For the optimization problem, we have the following proposition.  
Proposition 1. In the integrated supply chain,  
(1) for fixed 𝑝𝑝, the profit function is concave in 𝜆𝜆. The optimal reliability parameter 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 can be derived by 
solving the equation  
 (𝜆𝜆 − 𝜆𝜆0)𝜆𝜆2 = (𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼+2𝑀𝑀)𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠4𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟                             (11) 
When 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 > 𝜆𝜆0; otherwise, 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 = 𝜆𝜆0;  
(2) for fixed 𝜆𝜆, the profit function is concave in 𝑝𝑝. The optimal price 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 can be derived by solving the 
equation  
                     𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 − ℎ
𝜃𝜃
𝑎𝑎 − �𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 + ℎ𝑃𝑃 + 𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼4𝜆𝜆 + 𝑀𝑀2𝜆𝜆� 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠′(𝑝𝑝)𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 = 0                    (12) 
when 𝑝𝑝 < 𝑏𝑏
𝑄𝑄
; otherwise, 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑏𝑏
𝑄𝑄
; where 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 = − 1𝜃𝜃 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 − 𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�𝑃𝑃 �, 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠′ = − 𝑄𝑄�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�𝜃𝜃�𝑃𝑃−𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1��.  
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B.1.                                         ■ 
Due to the complexity of the expressions in the Hessian matrix, it is impossible to prove the joint 
concavity of the profit function with respect to variables 𝑝𝑝 and 𝜆𝜆. With Proposition 1, we design an 
iteration algorithm (shown in Table 2) to derive the optimal solutions. 
Table 2. Algorithm 1 
Algorithm 1   
Step 1.  Start with 𝑙𝑙 = 0 and initialize 𝜆𝜆𝑄𝑄 = 𝜆𝜆0 .  
Step 2.  Calculate the optimal retail price 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 from (12) for the given 𝜆𝜆𝑄𝑄.  
Step 3.  Calculate the optimal 𝜆𝜆𝑄𝑄+1 from (11) based on 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄.  
Step 4.  
If the difference between 𝜆𝜆𝑄𝑄+1  and 𝜆𝜆𝑄𝑄  is sufficiently small (i.e., 
𝑒𝑒−4 ), set 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 = 𝜆𝜆𝑄𝑄+1  and 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 = 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄 , then output (𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 , 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 ) and stop. 
Otherwise, set 𝑙𝑙 = 𝑙𝑙 + 1 and go back to Step 2.  
Substituting the equilibrium strategies 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼, 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 into (8) yields the unit time total profits of the whole 
supply chain 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. The concavity of the function is shown by numerical test, which is shown in Figure 3.  
5.2. Decentralized scenario 
In the decentralized supply chain, the retailer is a Stackelberg gaming leader and the supplier is the follower. 
As the gaming leader, the retailer first sets the sales margin. Then, based on the retailer’s sales margin, the 
supplier sets its optimal wholesale price and reliability investment level to maximize its own profit. We use 
backward induction to solve the gaming problem. We start by solving the supplier’s optimization problem to 
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derive the response functions. Then, we study the optimal decisions of the retailer.  
The supplier’s optimization problem is  
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑤𝑤,𝜆𝜆: {𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤, 𝜆𝜆)}                             (13) 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.    𝑤𝑤 + 𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑏𝑏
𝑄𝑄
, 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 𝜆𝜆0.                  
Under receiving the retailer’s sales margin 𝑚𝑚, some important results can be obtained when solving the 
supplier’s problem.  
Proposition 2. In the decentralized scenario,  
(1) For constant 𝑤𝑤, the supplier’s profit function is concave in 𝜆𝜆. The optimal reliability parameter 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 can 
be derived by solving the equation  
 (𝜆𝜆 − 𝜆𝜆0)𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠2𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟.                             (14) 
(2) For constant 𝜆𝜆, the supplier’s profit function is concave in 𝑤𝑤. The optimal reliability parameter 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 can 
be derived by solving the equation  
 𝑏𝑏 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 + 𝐷𝐷(𝑤𝑤+𝑚𝑚)ℎ𝑄𝑄�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄2𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃 = 0.               (15) 
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix B.2.                                         ■ 
Corollary 1. For the same price retail (𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 = 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 ), the supplier will invest more in reliability 
improvement under the centralized case, i.e., 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 ≥ 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷.  
Proof. See the proof of Corollary 1 in Appendix B.3.                                           ■ 
From Equations (11) and (14), we find that the optimal reliability investment is closely linked to 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, 
which is determined by selling price to end customers. Comparing the result in the decentralized and 
centralized model, we show in Corollary 1 that, firms will be more willing to invest in reliability 
improvement in the centralized model comparing to the decentralized model.  
Due to the complexity of the expressions in the Hessian matrix, the concavity of the function is hard to 
prove by mathematical theory. But we can see the concavity in figure numerical test, which is shown in 
Figure 4. For the retailer, after knowing the best response function 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷(𝑚𝑚) and 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷(𝑚𝑚), and substitute the 
functions to retailer’s profit function, we have 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�𝑚𝑚,𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷(𝑚𝑚),𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷(𝑚𝑚)�. It is also hard to have an explicit 
expression of the profit function. However, we also shown in Figure 5 that the retailer’s profit function is 
concave in 𝑚𝑚. Thus, we design a two dimensional searching algorithm (shown in Table 3) to get the optimal 
decisions. 
Table 3. Algorithm 2 
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Algorithm 2   
Step 1.  Initialize 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 = 0.  
Step 2.  Start with 𝑘𝑘 = 1 and initialize 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 = 0. Given a small positive 
number 𝛿𝛿 = 10−3 (search step size).  
Step 3.  Calculate the optimal wholesale price 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘 and the optimal reliability 
level 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 from (14) and (15) and then the profit of the supplier 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠,𝑘𝑘.  
Step 4.  If 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟|𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 > 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟|𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘−1, set 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘+1 = 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿 and go to Step 3. 
Otherwise, denote 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 = 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘, 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 = 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘 and 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘, then output 
(𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷, 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷).  
Substituting the equilibrium strategies 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷, 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 into Equations (4) and (7) yields the unit time 
total profits of the retailer and the supplier 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠, respectively, and the profit of the whole supply 
chain 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 
5.3. Supply chain coordination 
In this subsection, we try to coordinate the supply chain with a cooperative reliability investment and 
revenue sharing contract. Assuming 𝜙𝜙 is the retailer’s sharing rate of the supplier’s sales revenue, and 𝛾𝛾 is 
the retailer’s sharing rate of the supplier’s reliability investment. The unit time total profits of the retailer and 
the supplier are respectively given by  
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤, 𝜆𝜆|𝜙𝜙, 𝛾𝛾) = (1−𝜙𝜙)�𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷(𝑤𝑤+𝑚𝑚)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1��𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 – ℎ𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠−1�𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 − 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟  
−
(1−𝛾𝛾)�𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆−𝜆𝜆0)2�
2
−
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
2𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
                                       (16) 
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑚𝑚|𝜙𝜙, 𝛾𝛾) = (𝑤𝑤 + 𝑚𝑚)𝐷𝐷(𝑤𝑤 + 𝑚𝑚) − (1−𝜙𝜙)�𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷(𝑤𝑤+𝑚𝑚)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1��𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟                      
−
ℎ𝐷𝐷(𝑤𝑤+𝑚𝑚)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
4𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
− 𝛾𝛾
𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆−𝜆𝜆0)2
2
                    (17) 
Proposition 3. Coordination can be achieved with a revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract 
only if the mechanism (𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 ,𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶 ,𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶 ,𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶) satisfies  
             𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶(𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶) = 2𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 − 𝑏𝑏
𝑄𝑄
+ �𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 + ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃�1−𝑒𝑒−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼��𝜃𝜃 + 𝑀𝑀2𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼� 𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠′�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�𝑄𝑄�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1��1−𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶�,            (18) 
 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶 = 𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼
𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼+2𝑀𝑀
∈ [0,1].                            (19) 
 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶(𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶) = 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 − 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝(𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶).                            (20) 
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix B.4.                                         ■ 
According to the contract structure, four coordinating tools can be used by both players to establish an 
efficient solution, i.e., the wholesale price, the sales margin, the investment sharing rate and revenue sharing 
rate. As shown in Proposition 3, the supplier and the retailer can adjust their share rates of revenue to obtain 
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a positive wholesale price and a proper subsidy proportion, i.e., 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶 > 0, 𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 > 0 and 0 < 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶 < 1, and 
thus coordinate the whole supply chain. Failing this, the supply chain cannot be coordinated by means of the 
revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract.  
Corollary 2. In the revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract, the wholesale price 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶  is 
increasing in 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶, while the retailer’s sales margin 𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 is decreasing in 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶.  
Proof. See the proof of Corollary 2 in Appendix B.5.                                           ■ 
This corollary illustrates that to reach a coordination result, the supplier should provide a higher 
wholesale price and the retailer should set a lower sales margin when the revenue sharing rate is higher. This 
result is intuitive and realistic. Besides, both the supplier and the retailer are willing to adopt the mechanism (𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶 ,𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 ,𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶 ,𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶), if and only if 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷. Hence, the following proposition can be 
derived.  
Proposition 4. Both the supplier and the retailer are willing to participate in the coordinating scenario rather 
than the decentralized setting only if 𝜙𝜙 ≤ 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶 ≤ 𝜙𝜙, where 𝜙𝜙 and 𝜙𝜙 are presented in Appendix B.6.  
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix B.6.                                         ■  
Proposition 4 reveals that the proposed contract is applicable only when the revenue sharing rate 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶 is 
moderate, otherwise, at least one of the two firms will not execute the contract. In the coordinating 
region 𝜙𝜙 ∈ �𝜙𝜙,𝜙𝜙�, the supplier can retailer can adjust their profit by changing the value of 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶, which also 
depends on the bargain power. 
6. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis 
In this section, numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are presented to illustrate the proposed 
algorithms and the coordination results, which also help us to gain some managerial insights. 
6.1. Numerical examples 
We set the parameters for the numerical case in Table 4.   
Table 4. Parameter settings 
𝑏𝑏 = 200 𝑎𝑎 = 10 𝑘𝑘 = 20 𝑃𝑃 = 200 
ℎ = 2 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 = 50 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 = 80 
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 = 1 𝑟𝑟 = 100 𝜆𝜆0 = 1.0 𝜃𝜃 = 0.2 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 𝑀𝑀 = 100   
With the given data, results can be obtained by using Matlab software. As shown in Figure 3, the unit 
time total profit of the whole supply chain is concave in 𝜆𝜆 and 𝑝𝑝. Then, applying Algorithm 1, we obtain 
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the optimal strategies in the integrated supply chain as 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 = 12.38, 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 = 1.564, 𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼 = 84.41, and the unit 
time total profit 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 = 497.06.  
Similarly, Figure 4 shows the concavity of 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 in 𝑤𝑤 and 𝜆𝜆, and Figure 5 indicates the concavity of 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 in 𝑚𝑚 for the given 𝑤𝑤 and 𝜆𝜆. Applying Algorithm 2, the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and 
the retailer are 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 = 10.00, 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 = 6.35, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 1.303, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 = 40.38, respectively. The corresponding unit 
time total profits 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 = 248.95, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 = 76.87, and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 325.82.  
Comparing the strategies obtained from two supply chain structures, we find that the retail price (𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼) in 
the integrated scenario is less than that of the decentralized scenario (𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷) due to the double 
marginalization effect. Meanwhile, theoptimal reliability level and ordering quantity, as well as the unit time 
total profit under the integrated scenario are greater than those of the decentralized one.  
As shown in Proposition 3, the supply chain can be coordinated by setting appropriate coordinating 
parameters. Figure 6 shows the change of profit for the two parties before and after coordination. The 
supplier’s profit drops while the retailer’s profit rises in the revenue sharing rate 𝜙𝜙. Based on Proposition 4, 
we also observe that there exists a feasible region of 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶 ∈ [0.562,0.828] in which the two parties will 
achieve a win-win situation.   
 
Figure 3. The supply chain’s profit change with respect to 𝜆𝜆 and 𝑝𝑝 in the centralized case. 
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 Figure 4. The supplier’s profit change with respect to 𝜆𝜆 and 𝑤𝑤 in the decentralized case when 𝑚𝑚 =  10. 
 
 
Figure 5. The retailer’s profit change with respect to 𝑚𝑚 in the decentralized case. 
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 Figure 6. The retailer’s and the supplier’s profit change with respect to ϕ. 
6.2. Sensitivity analysis on equilibrium strategies 
In this subsection, we present the sensitivity analysis results on the equilibrium strategies with respect to key 
system parameters 𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑀𝑀, 𝜆𝜆0 and ℎ. We vary one parameter once and keep others fixed. Table 5 
summarizes the results for the centralized scenario and decentralized scenario, and provides some managerial 
insights for the supply chain management of deteriorating items. 
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis with respect to system parameters 𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, ℎ, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼 and 𝑀𝑀. 
Parameter 
values 
Centralized  
Supply Chain 
Decentralized  
supply chain  
 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼  𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼  𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼   𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷  𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷  𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷  𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷  
𝑃𝑃 = 180  12.45  1.597  83.53  489.71  9.97  6.40  1.325  40.13  245.65  76.04  321.69  
𝑃𝑃 = 190  12.41  1.580  83.99  493.57  9.98  6.38  1.314  40.29  247.38  76.71  324.09  
𝑃𝑃 = 200  12.38  1.564  84.41  497.06  10.00  6.35  1.303  40.38  248.95  76.87  325.82  
𝑃𝑃 = 210  12.34  1.549  84.78  500.23  10.01  6.33  1.294  40.50  250.38  77.34  327.72  
𝑃𝑃 = 220  12.31  1.535  85.13  503.13  10.02  6.31  1.285  40.61  251.69  77.74  329.43  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 1.6  12.15  1.574  86.88  532.87  10.17  6.07  1.310  41.66  265.99  86.65  352.64  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 1.8  12.26  1.569  85.65  514.83  10.09  6.21  1.306  40.99  257.41  81.51  338.92  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2.0  12.38  1.564  84.41  497.06  10.00  6.35  1.303  40.38  248.95  76.87  325.82  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2.2  12.49  1.559  83.18  479.55  9.90  6.50  1.300  39.82  240.62  72.69  313.31  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2.4  12.60  1.554  81.95  462.32  9.82  6.64  1.297  39.16  232.42  67.79  300.21  
𝜃𝜃 = 0.16  12.29  1.557  83.59  506.03  9.90  6.39  1.302  40.23  256.12  78.26  334.39  
𝜃𝜃 = 0.18  12.33  1.560  84.00  501.59  9.93  6.38  1.303  40.41  252.54  78.38  330.92  
𝜃𝜃 = 0.20  12.38  1.564  84.41  497.06  10.00  6.35  1.303  40.38  248.95  76.87  325.82  
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𝜃𝜃 = 0.22  12.42  1.567  84.80  492.44  10.02  6.35  1.305  40.61  245.34  75.37  320.71  
𝜃𝜃 = 0.24  12.46  1.570  85.18  487.74  10.12  6.30  1.306  40.82  241.75  74.62  316.37  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.1  12.36  1.509  84.57  499.93  9.94  6.38  1.305  40.69  250.52  79.30  329.82  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.3  12.37  1.537  84.49  498.48  9.98  6.36  1.304  40.48  249.74  77.68  327.42  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.5  12.38  1.564  84.41  497.06  10.00  6.35  1.303  40.38  248.95  76.87  325.82  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.7  12.38  1.589  84.33  495.66  10.04  6.33  1.302  40.17  248.16  75.26  323.42  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.9  12.39  1.613  84.25  494.28  10.06  6.32  1.302  40.07  248.16  74.45  322.62  
𝑀𝑀 = 60  12.35  1.448  84.73  502.92  10.03  6.30  1.212  40.59  251.66  78.94  330.59  
𝑀𝑀 = 80  12.36  1.509  84.57  499.93  10.01  6.33  1.260  40.51  250.27  78.07  328.34  
𝑀𝑀 = 100  12.38  1.564  84.41  497.06  10.00  6.35  1.303  40.38  248.95  76.87  325.82  
𝑀𝑀 = 120  12.39  1.613  84.25  494.28  9.97  6.38  1.343  40.36  247.68  76.52  324.20  
𝑀𝑀 = 140  12.40  1.659  84.11 491.60  9.95  6.41  1.379  40.30  246.46  75.81  322.28  
ℎ = 1.0  11.88  1.586  89.92  559.34  9.72  6.40  1.317  42.99  278.04  93.00  371.04  
ℎ = 1.5  12.14  1.575  87.12  527.54  9.87  6.37  1.310  41.61  263.20  84.36  347.56  
ℎ = 2.0  12.38  1.564  84.41  497.06  10.00  6.35  1.303  40.38  248.95  76.87  325.82  
ℎ = 2.5  12.61  1.553  81.79  467.83  10.13  6.33  1.297  39.18  235.27  69.66  304.93  
ℎ = 3  12.84  1.542  79.25  439.81  10.24  6.32  1.291  38.11  222.11  63.50  285.61  
(1) Sensitivity analysis of production rate 𝑃𝑃  
We find from Table 5 that under the decentralized scenario, as production rate 𝑃𝑃 increases, 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 and 
𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 decrease, while 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 increase. The selling price 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 also decreases 
in 𝑃𝑃. This implies that a higher production rate 𝑃𝑃 gives the supplier more initiatives to reduce the 
wholesale price and stimulate the retailer’s demand. Accordingly, the ordering quantity increases with lower 
wholesale price, and the retail price decreases when the wholesale price is smaller. In addition, a larger 𝑃𝑃 
shortens supplier’s production time, which reduces the probability of defective risk during one production 
cycle. To cut cost, the supplier decreases the reliability investment. Moreover, decreasing retail price 
stimulates sales, resulting in higher unit time total profits for the supplier, the retailer and the whole supply 
chain. Under the integrated scenario, as 𝑃𝑃 increases, 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 and 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 decrease, while 𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼  increase. 
These results are in line with those in the decentralized case. Obviously, retail price in the integrated channel 
is significantly less than that of the decentralized one, i.e., 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 < 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷, and reliability investment is 
greater than that in the decentralized setting, i.e., 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 > 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷, which leads to higher profits for the supply chain.  
(2) Sensitivity analysis of unit production cost 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝  
Under the decentralized scenario, Table 5 shows that when production cost 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝  increases, 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 
increases, while 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decrease. From economic point of view, when the 
unit production cost rises, the supplier will raise the wholesale price to protect its sales margin, along with a 
higher retail price set by the retailer, which leads to a lower demand rate and the drop of ordering quantity. 
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This leads to reductions in profits of the supplier, the retailer and the whole supply chain. In the meantime, 
when the ordering quantity drops, the production cycle is shortened, which also reduces the defective 
probability. The maximum profit can be reached using a relatively low investment level. In the integrated 
scenario, when 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝  increases, 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼  increases, while 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 , 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷  and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷  decrease, which share the same 
variation trends with those in the decentralized scenario. It is shown that the retail price in theintegrated 
channel is less than that of the decentralized one. Also, the reliability investment is greater than that of the 
decentralized channel, which contributes to higher profits.  
(3) Sensitivity analysis of original deterioration rate θ  
In the decentralized scenario, we show in Table 5 that as the deterioration rate θ increases, 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 
and 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 increase, whereas 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decrease. This implies that, when deterioration rate θ 
is higher, more products will be ordered from the supplier. Therefore, the supplier’s production cycle is 
extended, which may result in higher defective risk and lead to higher restoration cost. To reduce the cost, 
the supplier will invest more to enhance the reliability. Meanwhile, to reduce the deteriorating quantity, the 
retailer will set a higher sales margin, which aims to reduce demand rate and achieve lower inventory level. 
The high deterioration rate plays a negative role in the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the whole 
supply chain. The optimal strategies and profits in the integrated scenario have similar sensibilities against 
the deterioration rate with those in the decentralized scenario  
(4) Sensitivity analysis of defective rate α  
In the decentralized scenario, as the defective rate α increases, 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 increases, whereas 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷, 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟
𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decrease. This implies that when defective rate α is higher, the retailer will try to 
maintain its profit by setting higher sales margin under a higher penalty cost. The raised sale margin leads to 
a lower demand rate and lower ordering quantity. To induce the retailer order more products, the supplier will 
set a lower wholesale price. The reduced ordering quantity shortens the production cycle, thus the defective 
probability drops and less investment is needed to achieve an appropriate reliability level. Since α incurs 
more cost, the supplier, the retailer and the supply chain profit all decrease. In the integrated scenario, the 
selling price 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 and reliability level 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 increase, while the ordering quantity 𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼 and total supply chain 
profit 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼  decreases. It is interesting that 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 increases in α in the decentralized scenario. This is because in 
the integrated scenario, the supplier only cares about its own profit and higher α do not affect its profit 
directly. However, in the integrated scenario, α affects the total profit directly. Investing more in reliability 
will reduce the total profit. So, in the integrated scenario, 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 increases in α. Comparing the profits in the two 
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scenarios, the total profit of the integrated scenario is significantly higher than that of the decentralized 
scenario.  
(5) Sensitivity analysis of restoration cost M  
In the decentralized scenario, with higher M, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 and 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 increases, whereas 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷, 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠
𝐷𝐷 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decrease. This reveals that when restoration cost α is higher, the supplier will invest more in 
reducing the defective risk, thus compress the expected restoration cost. Meanwhile, the raised restoration 
cost pushes the supplier to set a higher wholesale price. When the supplier’s wholesale price rises, the 
retailer also needs to set a higher selling cost (𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷), which will leads to the drop of ordering quantity. 
Although the selling price rises, the retailer’s sales margin is cut down, its profit will be badly hurt. In 
addition, the supplier’s profit and the supply chain profit drop as well due to the rise of supplier’s restoration 
cost. The optimal strategies and profits in the integrated scenario have similar sensibilities against the 
deterioration rate with those in the decentralized scenario.  
(6) Sensitivity analysis of unit inventory holding cost ℎ  
As seen from Table 5, in the decentralized scenario, when the unit inventory holding cost ℎ rises, 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 
increases, whereas 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decrease. When the holding cost ℎ is higher, the 
retailer inclined to avoid too much inventory by setting a higher sales margin and reducing the ordering 
quantity. To induce the retailer order more products, the supplier will reduce its wholesale price. Meanwhile, 
the reduction of ordering quantity shortens the production cycle and reduces the defective risk. To achieve 
the maximum of profit, the supplier is intended to set a lower reliability level. It conforms to intuition that 
higher holding cost will hurt both firms’ profits and the supply chain profit. In the integrated scenario, when 
ℎ increases, 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 increases, while 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 decrease, which have the same sensibilities against h 
with those in the decentralized scenario. It also shows that the supply chainprofit under integrated channel is 
significantly higher than that of the decentralized one.  
We also presented two numerical examples with exponential distributed reliability in Appendix A.1 and 
cubic investment cost in Appendix A.2. Similar results can be obtained in the numerical results. 
6.3 The impacts of unreliability ignorance 
In the main model, we assume that both the supplier and retailer make pricing decisions under the 
consideration of unreliability costs. However, what if the supplier or/and the retailer ignore the costs? In this 
subsection, we study the impacts of unreliability ignorance to the firms’ optimal pricing decisions and profit 
change in the Stackelberg game. We consider three cases, i.e., supplier ignorance, retailer ignorance, both 
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firms ignorance, and compare the results with that in the main model.  
In the supplier ignorance case, the supplier will make price decisions without considering the costs of 
selling bad quality products and the reliability investment; in the retailer ignorance case, the retailer make 
price decisions without considering the costs of selling bad quality products; in the both ignorance case, the 
supplier and retailer both ignore the costs of selling bad quality products and reliability investment. We use 
the data presented in Table 4. The numerical results are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6. Comparative results when firms may ignore unreliability 
 𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷  𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷  𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷  𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷  
Both firms ignore 10.08 6.22 1 41.00 256.43 72.04 
Supplier ignore 10.12 6.20 1 40.79 256.44 70.45 
Retailer ignore 9.89 6.41 1.306 40.95 248.87 81.34 
No firm ignore 10.00 6.35 1.303 40.38 248.95 76.87 
In Figure 7 and 8, we testified the impacts of firms’ unreliability ignorance to the price decisions and 
the corresponding profits. Firstly, we show that when the retailer ignores the unreliability costs when making 
price decisions, the retailer will set the lowest sales margin and the supplier will set the highest wholesale 
price. The distortion of the optimal prices for both firms when the retailer ignores the unreliability cost 
slightly hurts the retailer’s benefit, however, it significantly contribute to the supplier’s profit. Secondly, we 
also show that when the supplier itself ignores the unreliability costs when making price decisions, the 
retailer will set the highest sales margin, thus the supplier will set the lowest sales margin. As a result, the 
retailer’s ignorance of unreliability cost hurts the retailer’s profit, and benefit the retailer. Lastly, when both 
firms ignore the unreliability costs, the wholesale price will be lower and sales margin will be higher than 
that in the main model. The retailer’s profit increases, while the supplier’s profit dramatically decreases. In 
summary, ignoring the unreliability cost will cause uneconomical decisions and leads to profit drop. 
 
Figure 7. Impacts of reliability ignorance to price decisions and profits when 𝜃𝜃 changes 
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Figure 8. Impacts of reliability ignorance to price decisions and profits when 𝜆𝜆0 changes 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis on coordinating results 
The sensitivity analysis on feasible region of coordinating parameter 𝜙𝜙 with respect to system parameters 
𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑀𝑀 and ℎ is presented in Table 7. We show that both the upper bound (𝜙𝜙) and lower bound (𝜙𝜙) 
of the feasible region increases in 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼 and ℎ, whereas decreases in 𝑃𝑃 and 𝑀𝑀. It implies that for 
higher 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼 and ℎ, to achieve the supply chain coordination, more supplier’s wholesales revenue 
should be shared with the retailer. However, for higher 𝑃𝑃 and 𝑀𝑀 a relatively low sharing rate will help the 
two firms realize the coordination. We also tested the size of the feasible region, i.e., 𝛥𝛥𝜙𝜙 = 𝜙𝜙 − 𝜙𝜙, which is 
expanded for higher 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝛼𝛼 and ℎ, and lower 𝑀𝑀. It means that the supply chain will be more likely to be 
coordinated when the production cost, the defective rate and inventory cost is high, or the supplier’s 
restoration cost is low. 
Table 7. Coordination parameter 𝜙𝜙 with respect to system parameters 𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑀𝑀 and ℎ. 
𝑃𝑃  180 190 200 210 220  Impact  𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 Impact  
𝜙𝜙  0.833  0.830  0.828  0.826  0.824  ↓ 𝜙𝜙 0.825  0.827  0.828  0.828  0.830 ↑  
𝜙𝜙  0.567  0.564  0.562  0.560  0.558  ↓  𝜙𝜙 0.561 0.561  0.562  0.562  0.563 ↑  
Δ𝜙𝜙  0.266  0.266  0.266  0.266  0.266  −  Δ𝜙𝜙  0.264  0.266  0.2660  0.266  0.267 ↑  
𝜃𝜃  0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24  Impact  𝛼𝛼 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 Impact  
𝜙𝜙  0.820  0.823  0.828  0.830  0.837  ↑ 𝜙𝜙 0.825  0.827  0.828  0.830  0.831 ↑  
𝜙𝜙  0.554 0.559  0.562  0.568  0.569  ↑ 𝜙𝜙 0.562  0.562  0.562  0.562  0.563 ↑  
Δ𝜙𝜙  0.266  0.266  0.266  0.266  0.266  −  Δ𝜙𝜙  0.263  0.265  0.266  0.268  0.268 ↑   
𝑀𝑀  60 80 100 120 140  Impact  ℎ  1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Impact  
𝜙𝜙  0.828  0.828  0.828  0.827  0.826  ↓  𝜙𝜙  0.804  0.817  0.828  0.839  0.849 ↑  
𝜙𝜙  0.562  0.562  0.562  0.562  0.561  ↓  𝜙𝜙  0.546  0.554  0.562  0.570  0.578 ↑  
Δ𝜙𝜙  0.266  0.266  0.266  0.265  0.265  ↓  Δ𝜙𝜙  0.258  0.263  0.266  0.269  0.271 ↑  
Note: Δ𝜙𝜙 = 𝜙𝜙 − 𝜙𝜙, which denotes the size of the coordinating zone. 
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 Figure 9. The retailer’s and the supplier’s profit change with respect to ϕ. 
In Figure 9, we show the impacts of coordination contract implementation to the profit change of the 
total supply chain with respect to parameters 𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑀𝑀 and ℎ. It is shown that after coordination, the 
total supply chain profit increases over 50% in this numerical case. Firstly, we observe that profit increment 
after coordination increases with 𝑃𝑃 and 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, which indicates that the two firms will be more willing to 
cooperate when the supplier’s production rate or production cost is high. Secondly, we find that when 
production deterioration rate or unit inventory holding cost is high, coordination will bring more profit to the 
supply chain. Thirdly, we can also see that profit increment is not monotonically increasing in 𝛼𝛼 and 𝑀𝑀. 
When either 𝛼𝛼  or 𝑀𝑀  becomes high, the willingness to coordination may slightly drop. Overall, the 
cooperative investment and revenue sharing contract helps the supply chain to significantly increase the total 
profit. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, a two-echelon supply chain for deteriorating items involving a supplier and a retailer with 
endogenous reliability and price-dependent demand is studied. The supplier’s production line is unreliable 
and defective items will be produced during the out-of-control period. Meanwhile, the supplier can invest to 
enhance its production line’s reliability and reduce the expected defective rate. We first study the optimal 
decisions under the integrated and decentralized scenarios. To obtain the results, two algorithms are designed 
to searching for the optimal decisions. Comparing the optimal results in the two scenarios, we find that 
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supply chain integration increases the performance of the total supply chain, and makes the production 
system more reliable. Then, we proposed a revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract to 
coordinate the supply chain, with which, the retailer shares part of the supplier’s investment, in return, the 
supplier shares part of its revenue with the retailer. We use numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis to 
further illustrate the properties of the model, and gain some important managerial implications.  
The model can be extended in three ways. Firstly, in this paper we studied a static pricing and 
investment problem. However, in real business, firms can dynamically change their pricing or investment 
decisions. Therefore, in the future, we can consider about the dynamic marketing and investing strategies. 
Secondly, in industry, there can be many firms in the same level in the supply chain. Therefore, studying how 
competition affects firms’ pricing and reliability control decisions is more interesting and more practical, 
which is another direction of our future research. Thirdly, in this model, we have only studied a two level 
supply chain. In real industry, the supply chain can have multiple levels whose production may also be 
unreliable. How to control quality throughout the supply chain is also worth studying. Fourthly, in this paper, 
we only study the quality uncertain problems; however, quantity and quantity can both be affected, which 
can also be one of our future research directions. Lastly, in this paper, we assume that the firm can only 
produce one product. In the future, we can study firms’ assortment planning with reliability control. 
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Appendix A. Two numerical examples 
Appendix A.1 Numerical results when 𝒔𝒔 is exponentially distributed 
We keep the parameters unchanged in the numerical example except for 𝑠𝑠, which follows a exponential 
distribution. In other words, 𝑓𝑓𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠) = 1𝜆𝜆 𝑒𝑒−𝑠𝑠𝜆𝜆, 𝐹𝐹𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠) = 1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑠𝑠𝜆𝜆.  
The optimal strategies in the integrated supply chain as 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 = 13.86, 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 = 1.614, 𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼 = 150.90, and 
the unit time total profit 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 = 388.85. The equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer are 
𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 = 11.12, 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 = 6.04, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 1.370, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 = 69.82, respectively. The corresponding unit time total profits 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟
𝐷𝐷 = 183.13, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 = 72.74, and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 255.87. Sensitivity analysis with respect to system parameters 
𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑀𝑀 and h are listed in Table A.1. 
 
Appendix A.2 Numerical results when the investment cost follows a cubic form 
We keep the parameters unchanged in the numerical example except for a cubic investment cost =
𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆 − 𝜆𝜆0)3/2 
The optimal strategies in the integrated supply chain as 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 = 12.37, 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 = 1.599, 𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼 = 84.43, and the 
unit time total profit 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 = 498.47. The equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer are 
𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷 = 9.99, 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 = 6.34, 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 1.414, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 = 40.46, respectively. The corresponding unit time total profits 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟
𝐷𝐷 = 249.73, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 = 77.69, and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 = 327.43. Sensitivity analysis with respect to system parameters 𝑃𝑃, 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑀𝑀 and h are listed in Table A.2. 
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Table A.1. Sensitivity analysis with respect to system parameters 𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑀𝑀 and h when s is 
exponentially distributed 
Parameter 
values 
Centralized  
supply chain 
Decentralized  
supply chain  
 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼  𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼  𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼   𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷  𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷  𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷  𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷  
𝑃𝑃 = 180  14.01  1.632  147.31  377.23  11.13  6.11  1.387  68.65  178.39 70.53  248.92   
𝑃𝑃 = 190  13.93  1.623  149.18  383.29  11.12  6.07  1.378  69.16  180.87  71.36  252.23   
𝑃𝑃 = 200  13.86  1.614  150.89  388.84  11.12  6.04  1.370  69.82  183.13  72.74  255.87  
𝑃𝑃 = 210  13.80  1.605  152.46  393.95  11.11  6.02  1.363  70.53  185.21  74.37  259.58   
𝑃𝑃 = 220  13.74  1.597  153.89  398.65  11.10  5.99  1.355  70.86  187.13  74.85  261.97  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 1.6 13.63  1.622  156.66  422.24  11.29  5.76  1.377  72.59  198.37  81.46  279.84  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 1.8  13.75  1.618  153.77 405.37  11.22  5.89  1.373 71.04  190.68  76.52  267.20  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2.0  13.86 1.614  150.89 388.84 11.12  6.04  1.370  69.82 183.13  72.74  255.87  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2.2  13.98  1.610  148.03 372.66 11.01  6.20  1.366 68.70  175.72  69.37  245.10  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2.4 14.10  1.605  145.18  356.80  10.97  6.31  1.361  66.84 168.48  63.71  232.20  
𝜃𝜃 = 0.16 13.63  1.609  150.24  411.21  10.85 6.15  1.370  70.54 197.02  78.62  275.64  
𝜃𝜃 = 0.18 13.74 1.612  150.64 400.15  10.99  6.09  1.370  70.14  190.06  75.52  265.58  
𝜃𝜃 = 0.20 13.86  1.614  150.89 388.84 11.12  6.04 1.370 69.82 183.13  72.74  255.87  
𝜃𝜃 = 0.22 13.99  1.619  151.00 377.29  11.26  5.97  1.369  69.34  176.22  69.58  245.81  
𝜃𝜃 = 0.24  14.12  1.618  150.94  365.50  11.36  5.94  1.369  69.27  169.33  67.79  237.13  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.1 13.84  1.539  151.46  393.25  11.12  6.04  1.370 69.81  185.55  72.74 258.29  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.3 13.85 1.578 151.17  391.02  11.12 6.04  1.370  69.81  184.34 72.74  257.08  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 13.86  1.614  150.89  388.84  11.12  6.04  1.370 69.82 183.13  72.74  255.87  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.7 13.88 1.648  150.62 386.71  11.17  6.01 1.368 69.28 181.92  71.00  252.93  
𝛼𝛼 = 0.9 13.89  1.681  150.35  384.62  11.17  6.01  1.368 69.28  180.72  71.00  251.72  
𝑀𝑀 = 60  13.82 1.485  151.85 397.06  11.19  5.95  1.258  70.22  186.68 75.11  261.79  
𝑀𝑀 = 80 13.84 1.552  151.36  392.88  11.17  5.98  1.317  69.84  184.87  73.35  258.23  
𝑀𝑀 = 100  13.86 1.614  150.89  388.84  11.12  6.04  1.370  69.82 183.13  72.74 255.87  
𝑀𝑀 = 120 13.88  1.671  150.43  384.93  11.10  6.07  1.417  69.48 181.44  71.15 252.60  
𝑀𝑀 = 140  13.90 1.723  149.98  381.12  11.06  6.11  1.460 69.38  179.81  70.33  250.14  
ℎ = 1.0  12.88  1.646  175.05  501.99  11.09 5.58 1.400 81.69 259.24  113.26  372.51  
ℎ = 1.5 13.39  1.630  162.46 442.54 11.11  5.81  1.385 75.67 219.60  91.98  311.59  
ℎ = 2.0  13.86  1.614  150.89  388.84  11.12  6.04  1.370  69.82  183.13  72.74  255.87  
ℎ = 2.5 14.30  1.597  140.20  340.21  11.15  6.25  1.352  63.79  149.76  54.45  204.21  
ℎ = 3.0  14.70  1.580  130.27 296.09  11.19  6.46  1.334  57.73  119.44  37.57  157.01  
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Table A.2. Sensitivity analysis with respect to system parameters 𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, 𝜃𝜃, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑀𝑀 and h when the 
investment cost follows a cubic form 
Parameter values Centralized  
supply chain 
Decentralized  
supply chain  
 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼  𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼  𝑄𝑄𝐼𝐼  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼   𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷  𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷  𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷  𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷  
𝑃𝑃 = 180  12.45 1.621 83.55 491.16 9.97 6.39 1.431 40.16 246.45 76.53 322.98 
𝑃𝑃 = 190  12.41 1.610 84.01 495.00 10.02 6.35 1.421 40.16 248.18 75.95 324.13 
𝑃𝑃 = 200  12.37 1.599 84.43 498.47 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 249.73 77.69 327.43 
𝑃𝑃 = 210  12.33 1.589 84.81 501.62 10.03 6.29 1.400 40.63 252.45 78.10 330.56 
𝑃𝑃 = 220  12.30 1.579 85.15 504.50 10.01 6.28 1.387 41.01 254.73 80.29 335.02 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 1.6 12.14 1.605 86.90 534.29 10.18 6.05 1.419 41.68 266.79 87.07 353.87 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 1.8  12.26 1.602 85.66 516.25 10.06 6.21 1.417 41.22 258.18 83.58 341.77 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2.0  12.37 1.599 84.43 498.47 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 249.73 77.69 327.43 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2.2  12.48 1.596 83.20 480.96 9.88 6.50 1.412 39.95 241.39 73.91 315.31 
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = 2.4 12.59 1.592 81.97 463.72 9.79 6.64 1.410 39.34 233.19 69.38 302.58 
𝜃𝜃 = 0.16 12.28 1.595 83.61 507.44 9.90 6.37 1.413 40.25 256.90 78.68 335.59 
𝜃𝜃 = 0.18 12.33 1.597 84.02 502.99 9.92 6.37 1.414 40.48 253.32 79.20 332.53 
𝜃𝜃 = 0.20 12.37 1.599 84.43 498.47 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 249.73 77.69 327.43 
𝜃𝜃 = 0.22 12.41 1.601 84.82 493.86 10.07 6.31 1.414 40.42 246.14 76.17 322.32 
𝜃𝜃 = 0.24  12.46 1.603 85.21 489.16 10.14 6.28 1.415 40.39 242.54 74.64 317.18 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.1 12.35 1.562 84.60 501.26 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 251.19 77.69 328.89 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.3 12.36 1.581 84.51 499.86 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 250.46 77.69 328.16 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 12.37 1.599 84.43 498.47 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 249.73 77.69 327.43 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.7 12.38 1.616 84.35 497.10 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 249.00 77.69 326.70 
𝛼𝛼 = 0.9 12.38 1.631 84.27 495.74 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 248.27 77.69 325.97 
𝑀𝑀 = 60  12.34 1.520 84.77 504.13 10.08 6.27 1.339 40.39 252.36 77.45 329.82 
𝑀𝑀 = 80 12.35 1.562 84.60 501.26 10.05 6.30 1.379 40.37 251.03 77.15 328.18 
𝑀𝑀 = 100  12.37 1.599 84.43 498.47 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 249.73 77.69 327.43 
𝑀𝑀 = 120 12.38 1.631 84.27 495.74 9.99 6.36 1.444 40.29 248.48 76.25 324.73 
𝑀𝑀 = 140  12.40 1.661 84.11 493.07 9.94 6.40 1.471 40.38 247.24 76.86 324.10 
ℎ = 1.0  11.87 1.613 89.94 560.77 9.75 6.36 1.424 42.85 278.84 92.15 370.99 
ℎ = 1.5 12.12 1.606 87.14 528.96 9.85 6.36 1.419 41.74 263.99 85.62 349.61 
ℎ = 2.0  12.37 1.599 84.43 498.47 9.99 6.34 1.414 40.46 249.73 77.69 327.43 
ℎ = 2.5 12.60 1.592 81.81 469.23 10.14 6.31 1.409 39.20 236.04 70.08 306.13 
ℎ = 3.0  12.83 1.585 79.28 441.20 10.28 6.28 1.404 37.99 222.88 62.76 285.65 
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Appendix B. Proofs 
Appendix B.1. Proof of Proposition 1 
Proof. (1) The second order derivative of the total profit function with respect to λ can be expressed as  
                        𝜕𝜕
2𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆2
= − (𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼+2𝑀𝑀)𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
4𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
2
𝜆𝜆3
–𝑘𝑘 < 0.                              (B.1) 
So, the profit function is concave in 𝜆𝜆. Thus, the optimal 𝜆𝜆 can be obtained by equating the first order 
derivative to zero, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
= 0. Simplify the function, and we obtain equation (11).  
(2) The second order derivative of the total profit function with respect to p can be expressed as  
 𝜕𝜕
2𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2
= −2𝑎𝑎 − �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃+ℎ𝑃𝑃+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟4𝜆𝜆+𝑀𝑀2𝜆𝜆�
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
′′(𝑝𝑝) = −2𝑎𝑎 − �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃+ℎ𝑃𝑃+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟4𝜆𝜆+𝑀𝑀2𝜆𝜆�
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
𝑄𝑄2�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
2
𝜃𝜃�𝑃𝑃−𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1��2 < 0 .        (B.2) 
So, the profit function is concave in 𝑝𝑝. Thus, the optimal 𝑝𝑝 can be obtained by equating the first order 
derivative to zero, i.e.,𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
= 0. Simplify the function, and we obtain equation (12).   
This ends the proof of Proposition 1.                                                     ■ 
 
Appendix B.2. Proof of Proposition 2 
Proof. (1) The second order derivative of the total profit function with respect to λ can be expressed as  
                          𝜕𝜕
2𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆2
= −𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
1
𝜆𝜆3
– 𝑘𝑘 < 0.                                  (B.3) 
So, the profit function is concave in 𝜆𝜆. Thus, the optimal 𝜆𝜆 can be obtained by equating the first order 
derivative to zero, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
= 0. Simplify the function, and we obtain equation (14).  
(2) According to the Taylor series theory, 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 can be approximated as 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 ≈
𝐷𝐷(𝑤𝑤+𝑚𝑚)
𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
. The second order 
derivative of the total profit function with respect to p can be expressed as  
 𝜕𝜕
2𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2
= −2𝑄𝑄�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
ℎ𝑄𝑄2�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
2
𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
< 0.                       (B.4) 
So, the profit function is concave in 𝑝𝑝. Thus, the optimal 𝑝𝑝 can be obtained by equating the first order 
derivative to zero, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
= 0. Simplify the function, and we obtain equation (15).  
This ends the proof of Proposition 2.                                                     ■ 
 
Appendix B.3. Proof of Corollary 1 
Proof. From proposition 1 and 2, we have  
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 (𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 − 𝜆𝜆0)(𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼)2 = (𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼+2𝑀𝑀)𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠4𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 .                              (B.5) 
 (𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 − 𝜆𝜆0)(𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷)2 = 2𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠4𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 .                              (B.6) 
Letting (B.5)-(B.6), we have  
                   (𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 − 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷)(𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼2 + 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷2 − 𝜆𝜆0𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 − 𝜆𝜆0𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼) = 𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠4𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 ≥ 0               (B.7) 
Because 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 ,𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 ≥ 𝜆𝜆0, we have 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼2 + 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷2 − 𝜆𝜆0𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 − 𝜆𝜆0𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 ≥ 0. Thus 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 − 𝜆𝜆𝐷𝐷 ≥ 0 is satisfied. 
This ends the proof of Corollary 1.                                                       ■ 
 
Appendix B.4. Proof of Proposition 3 
Proof. To achieve the coordination, after setting a sales margin m and investment sharing proportion 𝛾𝛾, the 
optimal decisions for the supplier is wholesale price 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 − 𝑚𝑚 and reliability parameter 𝜆𝜆 = 𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼. That is, 
the first order derivative of 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤, 𝜆𝜆|𝜙𝜙, 𝛾𝛾) w.r.t. and should satisfy  
                            𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝜆𝜆|𝜙𝜙,𝛾𝛾)
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤
|𝑤𝑤=𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼−𝑚𝑚,𝜆𝜆=𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 = 0,                           (B.8)                              𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤,𝜆𝜆|𝜙𝜙,𝛾𝛾)
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
|𝑤𝑤=𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼−𝑚𝑚,𝜆𝜆=𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 = 0,                           (B.9) 
That is  
          (1−𝜙𝜙)�𝑏𝑏−2𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼+𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚��𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
′�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
– ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃�1−𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼��𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠′�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�
𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
′�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�
2𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
= 0.          (B.10) 
                            𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝
𝐼𝐼�
2𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
− (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑘𝑘(𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼 − 𝜆𝜆0) = 0.                       (B.11) 
in which 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠(𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼) = − 1𝜃𝜃 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �1 − 𝐷𝐷�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼��𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�𝑃𝑃 � ,𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠′(𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼) = − 𝑄𝑄�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�𝜃𝜃�𝑃𝑃−𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1��. Substituting equation (11) into 
(B.11), we finally have 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶 = 𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼
𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼+2𝑀𝑀
. Solving equations (B.10) and substitute the results into 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼 −𝑚𝑚, 
we obtain equation (18) and (20).  
This ends the proof of Proposition 3.                                                     ■ 
 
Appendix B.5. Proof of Corollary 2 
Proof. The first order derivative of 𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 and 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶 with respect to 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶 is  
𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶
′ = �𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 + ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃�1−𝑒𝑒−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼��𝜃𝜃 + 𝑀𝑀2𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼� 𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠′�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�𝑄𝑄�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1��1−𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶�2 < 0, and 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶′ = −𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶′ > 0, respectively.  
This means that 𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶 is decreasing, while 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶 is increasing in 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶. 
This ends the proof of Corollary 2.                                                       ■ 
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 Appendix B.6. Proof of Proposition 4 
Proof. The results can be obtained by solving equations  
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝐶(𝜙𝜙) ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶(𝜙𝜙) ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷.                       (B.12) 
Solving the two inequalities, we have  
𝜙𝜙 = 1 − ⎩⎪⎪⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧
�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�−
ℎ𝐷𝐷�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼��𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1�
𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−
𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
–𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�
4𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
−𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶
𝑘𝑘�𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼−𝜆𝜆0�
2
2
−𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟
𝐷𝐷�𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟+
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃+
ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃�1−𝑒𝑒
−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝
𝐼𝐼�
�
𝜃𝜃
+
𝑀𝑀
2𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼
�
𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
′�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�
𝑎𝑎
𝐷𝐷�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�
⎭
⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎫
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1��𝑏𝑏
𝑎𝑎
−𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�
 ,            (B.13) 
         𝜙𝜙 = 1 − ⎩⎪⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧
�𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠
𝐷𝐷+
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝
𝐼𝐼�
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
+
ℎ𝑃𝑃�𝑒𝑒
−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝
𝐼𝐼�
+𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝
𝐼𝐼�−1�
𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
+
𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
+
�1−𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶��𝑘𝑘�𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼−𝜆𝜆0�
2
�
2
+
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝
𝐼𝐼�
2𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟
�𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟+
�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃+
ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃�1−𝑒𝑒
−𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑝𝑝
𝐼𝐼�
�
𝜃𝜃
+
𝑀𝑀
2𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼
�
𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠
′�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�
𝑎𝑎
𝐷𝐷�𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼�
⎭
⎪
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎫
𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼)�𝑒𝑒𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟−1��𝑏𝑏
𝑎𝑎
−𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼�
.  (B.14) 
Therefore, when 𝜙𝜙 ≤ 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶 ≤ 𝜙𝜙, the supply chain can be coordinated. 
This ends the proof of Proposition 4.                                                    ■ 
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